

## **Уряди меншості в європейських системах позитивного парламентаризму: особливості та причини формування, принципи функціонування та стабільність**

У статті розглянуто особливості формування, принципи функціонування, стабільність урядів меншості у європейських системах позитивного парламентаризму. Автор визначив місце урядів у системах міжінституційних відносин європейських парламентських демократій, уточнив сутність розподілу парламентських демократій на системи позитивного та негативного парламентаризму, окреслив місце урядів меншості та їх види у системах позитивного парламентаризму, деталізував історію урядів меншості у європейських системах позитивного парламентаризму, окреслив ключові причини/мотиви формування/відставок урядів меншості в системах позитивного парламентаризму, схарактеризував особливості стабільності урядів меншості у європейських системах позитивного парламентаризму.

*Ключові слова:* уряд меншості, парламентська демократія, позитивний парламентаризм, негативний парламентаризм, вотум довіри/вотум інвеститури, однопартійний і коаліційний уряд меншості, стабільність урядів.

## **Minority cabinets in european systems of positive parliamentarism: features and causes of formation, principles of functioning and stability**

The article is dedicated to analyzing features of formation, principles of functioning and stability of minority cabinets in European systems of positive parliamentarism. The author identified the role of cabinets in systems of inter-institutional relations in European parliamentary democracies, specified the nature parliamentary democracies' distribution onto the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism, outlined minority cabinets' role and variations in systems of positive parliamentarism, detailed the history of minority cabinets in European systems of positive parliamentarism, outlined the key reasons/motives of formation and resignations of minority cabinets in systems of positive parliamentarism, characterized features of minority cabinets' stability in European systems of positive parliamentarism.

**Keywords:** *minority cabinet, parliamentary democracy, positive and negative parliamentarism, vote of confidence/vote of investiture, single-party and coalition minority cabinets, cabinet stability.*

In modern European constitutional systems of governance (parliamentary monarchies, parliamentary and semi-presidential republics) one can observe stable tendencies towards development of *parliamentary democracy* and *parliamentarism*, the increase of their role in governing social processes, the revival of the idea of priority of legislative power in the state mechanism<sup>1</sup>. Parliamentary activity promotes application of the checks and balances system not only between separate elements of the state mechanism, but also within the legislative body. But under the conditions of parliamentary democracy, the role of parliamentary institution and phenomenon of parliamentarism is important in the context of *inter-institutional relations*, for instance, the influence of the parliament on the process of *government* formation, functioning and resignation. It is rather urgent in cases of minority cabinets, as they are represented by the parties, which totally do not have stable majority in the parliament, and depend on ad hoc agreements which take place between various parties and deputies in the parliament. It means, that under the rule of minority cabinets, different formal and factual parameters of inter-institutional relations between the government and parliament, i.e. institution of parliament and phenomenon of parliamentarism, acquire exceptional importance.

According to the mechanism of parliaments' influence on government formation/resignation, parliamentary democracies are divided into the systems of *positive and negative parliamentarism*<sup>2</sup>. Within the systems of *negative parliamentarism* the process of government formation does not directly depend on a positive (the one, which is supported by absolute or relative majority of deputies in the parliament) vote of confidence or depends on a negative vote of confidence in the government on the part of the parliament. Negative vote of confidence in the government means, that to start its work, the government must get a vote of

<sup>1</sup> *Parliamentary democracy* is traditionally interpreted as the democratic political system and democratic political regime (which, according to their structure can be a parliamentary republic, parliamentary monarchy or semi-presidential republic), where the governments/executive power are formed, supported, and also tolerated by the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament. See: V. Bogdanor, *The government formation process in the constitutional monarchies of North-West Europe*, [w:] D. Kavanagh, G. Peele (eds.), *Comparative Government and Politics*, Wyd. Westview Press 1984.; A. Bruswitz, *Vad menas med parlamentarism?*, "Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift" 1929, vol 32, s. 323–334.

<sup>2</sup> T. Bergman, *Formation rules and minority governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 23, nr 1, s. 55–66.; T. Bergman, *Constitutional rules and party goals in coalition formation*, Wyd. Umeå University Press 1995, s. 41–43.; L. De Winter, *The Role of Parliament in Government Formation and Resignation*, [w:] H. Döring, *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 115–151.; L. De Winter, P. Dumont, *Uncertainty and Complexity in Coalition Formation*, [w:] K. Strom, W. C. Müller, T. Bergman, *Cabinet and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 123–158.; U. Sieberer, *The Institutional Power of Western European Parliaments: A Multidimensional Analysis*, "West European Politics" 2011, vol 34, nr 4, s. 731–754.; F. Russo, L. Verzichelli, *The Adoption of Positive and Negative Parliamentarism: Systemic or Idiosyncratic Differences?*, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Salamanca, April 2014.; J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin, J.A. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Presented at the workshop on The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights, Istanbul 2013.; M. Molder, *Coherence of Coalition Governments Across Types of Parliamentarism*, Paper prepared for the 2014 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in panel "The Evolution of Parliamentarism and its Political Consequences"; T. Louwse, *Unpacking "positive" and "negative" parliamentarism*, Paper presented at the workshop "The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences" of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014.

confidence/vote of investiture, which means that the majority of deputies in the parliament will not vote against the prime-minister, constitution or program of the government. Thus, the government under the conditions of negative parliamentarism starts its activity only when it or its prime-minister is nominated by the head of the state or the parliament, without present support (a vote of confidence/vote of investiture) for the prime-minister, personal composition and program of the government by the absolute or relative majority of the parliamentary deputies or under the condition that the absolute majority of parliamentary deputies do not vote against the prime-minister, personal composition or program of the government. Correspondingly, the government gets vote of confidence from the parliament by the very fact of nomination of the prime-minister or the composition of the government or in case of non-objection to the personality of the prime-minister or the composition of the government by absolute majority of deputies in the parliament. However, the cabinet is considered to be valid, till it does not get a positive (which is supported by absolute or relative majority of parliamentary deputies, depends on each specific situation) vote of no confidence or while it does not receive a refusal of silent or negative confidence<sup>3</sup>. That is, the system of negative parliamentarism – institutionally-constitutional scenario, which is based on perpetual silent confidence in the cabinet, supported by the majority of deputies in the parliament (when the parliament does not refuse confidence to the government or does not pass a vote of no confidence in the government), or on the constant negative confidence in the cabinet, which is not objected by majority of parliamentary deputies. Power of the parliament is especially revealed in government functioning, as the refusal of silent confidence in the government or non-insurance of negative confidence in the government on the part of the parliament, concerning almost any issue, which is in the government competence can become a direct reason for government resignation (refusal of confidence in the government or loss of confidence in the government in the systems of negative parliamentarism, is, in fact, associated with a vote of no confidence in the systems of positive parliamentarism)<sup>4</sup>. It indicates, that within the systems of negative parliamentarism, parliamentary majority should not constantly and actively rise against the government, and the government makes use of silent confidence of the parliament, as a result of this, it is not the government, who must prove its support for the parliament, but

<sup>3</sup> Under the conditions of the system of negative parliamentarism confidence/investiture in the government is not always based on the parliamentary majority, because it cannot be guaranteed or can be secured negatively in the process of government formation. However, the refusal of positive confidence in the government or discontent of requirements, regarding negative confidence in the government in the process of government functioning is a reason for the long-term resignation of the government. Non-receipt or loss of positive confidence by the government or loss of negative confidence on the part of the parliament can cause resignation of the government or resignation of the government and parliament and the pre-term elections of the latter.

<sup>4</sup> T. Bergman, *Formation rules and minority governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 23, nr 1, s. 55–66.; L. Martin, R. Stevenson, *Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Journal of Political Science" 2001, vol 45, nr 1, s. 33–50.; K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, T. Bergman, *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining. The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008.; T. Bergman, *Constitutional Design and Government Formation: The Expected Consequences of Negative Parliamentarism*, "Scandinavian Political Studies" 1993, vol 16, nr 4, s. 285–304.

vice versa, the parliament must prove that “it cannot bear the government”<sup>5</sup>. The examples of the systems of negative parliamentarism are/were: Austria, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Finland (till 2000), France and Sweden<sup>6</sup>. Among of them, the most specific are Sweden and Portugal, where a negative vote of confidence/vote of investiture is presupposed. Thus, to realize its functions, the government must get a vote of confidence/vote of investiture, which means, that absolute majority of parliamentary deputies should not vote against the prime-minister, composition and program of the government. It is called negative majority and is characterized by the technique of combination of the principles of negative and positive parliamentarism<sup>7</sup>. In fact, it serves as formalization of negative parliamentarism, as the government acts till absolute majority of parliamentary deputies do not vote against it. If a vote of confidence in the government is supported by relative majority of deputies in the parliament, then the government goes on making use of its authority, because the negative absolute majority threshold is not reached<sup>8</sup>. The United Kingdom is rather a specific case, as a vote of confidence in the cabinet is not presupposed in this country. But, in fact, a vote of confidence in the government is represented by a vote of confidence in the speech of a candidate for the prime-minister position during the first meeting of the newly elected parliament. That is why, when one speaks of the United Kingdom, one refers not to a vote of confidence, but to the “moment of investiture”, as the vote of confidence in the candidates’ speech, as the practice shows, it is rather a symbolic and assertive and positive procedure which does not possess a “constitutional mandate”<sup>9</sup>.

Specificity of all systems of *positive parliamentarism* lies in the fact, that the process of government formation directly depends on a positive (which is supported by absolute/relative majority of parliamentary deputies<sup>10</sup>) vote of confidence in the government on the part of

<sup>5</sup> O. Khomenko, *Vykonavcha vlada za umov parlamentskoi respubliky ta monarkhii (parlamentskoi demokratii)*, “Forum prava” 2012, vol 1, s. 1042; I. Protsiuk, *Status uriadu v parlamentskii respubliki*, “Derzhavne budivnytstvo i mistseve samovriaduvannia” 2011, vol 21, s. 27.

<sup>6</sup> M. Molder, *Coherence of Coalition Governments Across Types of Parliamentarism*, Paper prepared for the 2014 ECPJ Joint Sessions of Workshops in panel “The Evolution of Parliamentarism and its Political Consequences”; T. Louwse, *Unpacking ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ parliamentarism*, Paper presented at the workshop “The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences” of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014.

<sup>7</sup> T. Bergman, *Constitutional rules and party goals in coalition formation*, Wyd. Umeå University Press 1995, s. 45; T. Bergman, When minority cabinets are the rule and majority coalitions the exception, [w:] W. C. Müller, K. Strom, *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press 2000, s. 193–225; T. Bergman, *Constitutional Design and Government Formation: The Expected Consequences of Negative Parliamentarism*, “Scandinavian Political Studies” 1993, vol 16, nr 4, s. 285–304.

<sup>8</sup> V. Bogdanor, *The government formation process in the constitutional monarchies of North-West Europe*, [w:] D. Kavanagh, G. L., Peele, *Comparative government and politics: Essays in Honor of S.E. Finer*, Wyd. Heinemann 1984, s. 56; J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin, J.A. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Presented at the workshop on The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights, Istanbul 2013.

<sup>9</sup> J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin, J.A. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Presented at the workshop on The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights, Istanbul 2013.

<sup>10</sup> I. Budge, M. Laver, *Office seeking and policy pursuit in coalition theory*, “Legislative Studies Quarterly” 1986, vol 11, s. 485–506; M. Laver, *Between theoretical elegance and political reality: Deductive models and cabinet coalitions in Europe*, [w:] G. Pridham, *Coalitional Behavior in Theory and Practice: An Inductive Model for Western Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1986, s. 32–44; M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1990; M. Laver, K. A. Shepsle, *Coalitions and cabinet government*, “American Political Science Review” 1990, vol 84, s. 873–890; K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

the parliament. It means, that the government starts its activity only when it (its prime-minister, personal constitution or/and program) passes a vote of confidence/vote of investiture by absolute or relative majority of parliamentary deputies (depends on every specific case). Correspondingly, the cabinet is valid till it has parliament's confidence or till it does not get a positive vote (supported by absolute/relative majority of parliamentary deputies) of no confidence (including simple or constructive vote of no confidence). It means, that within the system of positive parliamentarism, confidence/investiture in the government is constant and is ensured both at the stage of its initiating/formation, and in the process of its functioning. It also presupposes, that in the instrument of positive parliamentarism, the mechanism of influence on formation of a vote of confidence/vote of investiture in the government, duration of government formation, role of causes, and predictable consequences of the government advanced resignation are incorporated. In general, it shows, that parliamentary institution in the process of formation and determination of the type and composition of the governments in the systems of positive parliamentarism, is more important, than in the systems of negative parliamentarism. Among the examples of the systems of positive parliamentarism in the European parliamentary democracies, such countries as: Belgium (where the peculiarities of vote of confidence/vote of investiture are not formally mentioned, but are applied in practice), Bulgaria, Greece, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Finland (since 2000), Croatia and the Czech Republic<sup>11</sup> are singled out.

The process of distinguishing the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism is especially actual in the context of *minority cabinets*. The scientists usually suppose, that minority cabinets are often formed within the systems of negative parliamentarism, as the institutional conditions are more favorable there. But, as the experience of the European parliamentary democracies shows, rather often minority cabinets are formed in the systems of positive parliamentarism (for detailed information see Table 1). That is why, the research on minority cabinets within the systems of positive parliamentarism is very urgent and necessary. It will help to determine the way how positive parliamentarism correlates with minority cabinets, whether positive parliamentarism is a disembodied category according to the results for the governments. It will help to determine key reasons for formation, attributes of functioning and stability of minority cabinets in the systems of positive parliamentarism. To solve this problem, first of all, we focus on the theoretical and methodological clarification of the essence of minority cabinets, and then on evaluation of minority cabinets in the European systems of positive parliamentarism.

<sup>11</sup> C. R. Conrad, S. N. Golder, *Measuring Government Duration and Stability in Central Eastern European Democracies*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2010, vol 49, nr 1, s. 119–150.; K. Armingeon, D. Weisstanner, S. Engler, P. Potolidis, M. Gerber, P. Leimgruber, *Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2009*, Wyd. University of Berne 2011.; T. Louwse, *Unpacking 'positive' and 'negative' parliamentarism*, Paper presented at the workshop „The Evolution of Parliamentarism and Its Political Consequences“ of the European Consortium of Political Research, Salamanca, April 10–15, 2014

“*Minority cabinets*” are interpreted as the government cabinets, parties or party of which (i.e. parties that composite the government and are in office) do not make up absolute majority of places/mandates in the parliament or leading chamber of the parliament. It means, that minority cabinet is a formal-institutional case, when a parliamentary party individually or in a coalition with other parliamentary parties/leading chambers of the parliament, the share of which is less than a half or just a half of the full composition of the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament, forms the government. That is why, a share of parliamentary parties, which are not members of minority cabinets, equals more than 50% from the full quantity of mandates in the parliament or leading chamber of the parliament. But the reason for formation and further functioning of minority cabinet under the conditions of positive parliamentarism must be silent confidence in the government cabinet, supported by majority (absolute or relative, depends on every single case) of deputies in the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament (when the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament does not refuse confidence to the government or does not pass a vote of no confidence in the government)<sup>12</sup>. Though, the format of providing a vote of confidence in minority cabinets in the systems of positive parliamentarism is constitutionally predetermined – in different ways in each country (depends on peculiarities of a positive vote of confidence), it is usually reduced to the silent support of the nominated candidate for the prime-minister, composition and/or program of the government. It means, that in case of minority cabinets formation in the systems of positive parliamentarism, governmental and some/all non-governmental parliamentary parties must support the government cabinet by absolutely or relative parliamentary majority (depends on the country). But, it is under the condition, that apart governmental parties, all other parties, which support the cabinet, are not its members and are not in office.

Minority cabinets, as well as all other party governments are divided into two types – single-party and coalition. *Single-party minority cabinet* is a cabinet, whose party (which is a member of the government, thus is in office) does not have absolute majority of mandates in the parliament, i.e. has support of less than 50% or 50% sharp of deputies in the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament (formal or non-formal silent confidence in the government is provided by another/other party/parties in the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament or deputies with no party affiliation). *Coalition minority cabinet* is a cabinet, whose

<sup>12</sup> V. Herman, J. Pope, *Minority Governments in Western Democracies*, “British Journal of Political Science” 1973, nr 3, s. 191–212.; K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, “Comparative political Studies” 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 199–227.; K. Strom, *Deferred Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia*, “Legislative Studies Quarterly” 1986, nr 11, s. 583–605.; C. Crombez, *Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1996, nr 29, s. 1–29.; T. Bergman, *When minority cabinets are the rule and majority coalitions the exception*, [w:] W. Müller, K. Strom, *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 193–225.; C. Green-Pedersen, *Minority Governments and Party Politics: The Political and Institutional Background to the ‘Danish Miracle’*, “Journal of Public Policy” 2002, nr 21, s. 63–80.; B.E. Rasch, *Why Minority Governments? Executive-Legislative Relations in the Nordic Countries* [w:] T. Persson, M. Wiberg, *Parliamentary Government in the Nordic Countries at a Crossroads: Coping with Challenges from Europeanization and Presidentialisation*, Wyd. Santérus Academic Press 2011, s. 41–62.; M. Mattila, T. Raunio, *Government Formation in the Nordic Countries: The Electoral Connection*, “Scandinavian Political Studies” 2002, nr 25, s. 259–280.; A. Skjæveland, *Modeling Government Formation in Denmark and Beyond*, “Party Politics” 2009, nr 15, s. 715–735.

parties (which are the members of the government, thus are in office) do not constitute absolute majority in the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament, alone have support of less than 50% or 50% sharp of deputies in the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament (formal or non-formal silent confidence in the government is provided by another/other party/parties in the parliament/leading chamber of the parliament or deputies with no party affiliation)<sup>13</sup>.

It is theoretically and empirically known, that minority cabinets can be a forced measure or a simple phenomenon of inter-institutional political process, and also relations between the elected political parliamentary parties, elected to the parliament (under the condition that none of them has absolute majority in the parliament), but which, taking into consideration various reasons, cannot or do not want to form majority coalition cabinets (minimal-triumphant or excessive-triumphant). That is why, in most cases (in particular in the systems of positive parliamentarism) works the rule, according to which, inability or unwillingness of the parties, which alone do not have absolute majority in the parliament, to form coalition majority cabinets, are the reasons for appearance of several alternatives in front of the parties, political system and the country, namely: to form majority cabinet in the format of “wide coalition” or “coalition of national unity”; to form a single-party or coalition minority cabinet; to form non-party cabinet; pre-term parliamentary elections. It is obvious, that within the systems of positive parliamentarism, the most common, but not a single way out from the situation, when parliamentary parties, which alone do not have absolute majority in the parliament, cannot form coalition majority cabinets, is to form minority cabinets. But, in course of their activity, especially in the systems of positive parliamentarism, single-party and coalition minority cabinets carry out the same functions, as majority cabinets. The essential difference is that the head of the government must pay more attention to the threat of the pre-term resignation of the cabinet, caused by the refusal of silent confidence or by a vote of no confidence in minority cabinet. It means, that the large part of their attention, the prime-minister of minority cabinet pays to the relations with the parliamentary parties (both with government and non-government parties, which provide silent support for minority cabinet, and also with oppositional parties) and deputies with no party affiliation, what is less distinctive of majority cabinets. The point is that insufficient attention on the part of the prime-minister to non-government parties or parliamentary deputies with no affiliation, who provide formal and non-formal support for minority cabinet, can lead to the refusal of a silent vote of confidence in such government (what can often become a reason for the pre-term resignation of

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<sup>13</sup> It is reasonable to divide all minority cabinets into two models: minority cabinets with unstable support on the basis of the ad hoc agreement (the examples of such minority cabinets are rather accidental and are not peculiar of inter-institutional environment) and minority cabinets with stable support on the basis of general agreement between governmental and non-governmental/oppositional parties in exchange for some concession to non-governmental/oppositional parties (the examples of such minority cabinets are permanent, and stable in inter-institutional environment). This dichotomy is usually referred to coalition minority cabinets, where the structures of inter-party relations and competitiveness, in particular regarding support for the cabinets in the course of their formation and functioning, are much more visible and broader.

minority governments within the systems of positive parliamentarism, see Table 1). Nevertheless, the most frequently minority cabinets within the systems of positive parliamentarism resign as a result of regular or pre-term parliamentary elections. It does not mean that they are very stable, but on the contrary, minority cabinets are formed in case of political/inter-institutional crisis, when it is impossible to form majority cabinet, regular elections are in the near future or there is an agreement as to the pre-term elections, and till the results of the elections are made public, minority cabinet is to function. Consequently, it is clear, that minority cabinets (single-party and coalition) are more institutionally flexible in their political course, and are more open in the context of considering interests of the main political (in particular parliamentary) groups, than majority cabinets. It is very actual in the light of such fragmented party systems, as in Italy, Latvia, Romania. Besides, the agreement of all parliamentary parties to form minority cabinets in some European systems of positive parliamentarism is also based on the existence of a wide range of possibilities among parliamentary committees and commissions to influence internal and international life (it is rather actual for the systems of positive parliamentarism in Central-Eastern European countries). Under this conditions it is acceptable for the parties, which have party factions in the parliament, to concentrate their influence on parliamentary commissions activity (it is peculiar of Ireland, Italy, Romania)<sup>14</sup>.

Taking this into consideration, T. Bergman<sup>15</sup> assumes that minority cabinets, in particular in most systems of positive parliamentarism, became stereotyped and widespread phenomena. But the scientist states, that positive parliamentarism in the light of peculiarities of a positive vote of confidence in cabinets just complicates the process of minority government formation.<sup>16</sup> J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin and B.E. Rasch<sup>17</sup> affirm, that it is not possible to make a single conclusion, that within the systems of positive parliamentarism, the frequency of government

<sup>14</sup> The situation in the context of hypothetic formation of minority cabinets in the system of positive parliamentarism is a bit simplified by competitive relations between the parliamentary parties, which are likely to create permanent or situational parliamentary majority. To give one parliamentary party the right to form minority cabinet is the "lesser evil" for other parties, and that is why they will be interested in maintenance of the current correlation of political importance of the current parliamentary parties. It means, that minority cabinet on the basis of non-government parties' influence can have rather strong and stable support of the parliamentary majority, be capable of living and even stable. It is especially actual, when the right to form minority cabinet is given to the centrist party, and majority in the parliament belongs to the parties, which come from various parts of left-right ideological party spectrum, in particular, when some of the parties are not allowed to participate in the process of cabinet formation (the force of the so-called technique of "sanitary cordon"). During 1947-1987 it was peculiar of Italy, where minority cabinets were formed on the basis of Christian democrats (the centrist party). Very often this Italian experience is interpreted as the demonstration of the "sanitary cordon" technique, used against the Italian communists. In general, it means, that formation of minority cabinet is a logical way out of the situation, concerning the opposition between parties in the parliament. It goes without saying, that in such a case, minority cabinet can be criticized from the both parts of the spectrum, but the ideological opposition is a constraining factor for consolidation of representatives of oppositional parties, with the aim of the government overthrow.

<sup>15</sup> T. Bergman, *Formation rules and minority governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 23, nr 1, s. 61.

<sup>16</sup> The identical conclusions are supported by other researchers. See: L. De Winter, *Parties and government formation, portfolio allocation, and policy definition*, [w:] K.R. Luther, F. Müller-Rommel, *Political Parties in the New Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 171–206.; L. De Winter, *The Role of Parliament in Government Formation and Resignation*, [w:] H. Döring, *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin's Press 1995, s. 115–151.; K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; T. Saalfeld, *Members of parliament and governments in western Europe. Agency relations and problems of oversight*, European journal of political researches 2000, vol 37, s. 353–376.

<sup>17</sup> J.A. Cheibub, S. Martin, J.A. Rasch, *The Investiture Vote and the Formation of Minority Parliamentary Governments*, Presented at the workshop on The Importance of Constitutions: Parliamentarism, Representation, and Voting Rights, Istanbul 2013.



formation is lower, than in the systems of negative parliamentarism. The researchers confirm that as of 2009 in the systems of positive parliamentarism, minority governments in the time sample equaled 26% of total number of party government terms, and on the contrary, in the systems of negative parliamentarism it was 36% of total number of party government terms. And this clearly determines, that minority cabinets, except Scandinavian countries (as the systems of negative parliamentarism, where minority cabinets are formed permanently) are approved under the conditions of the parliamentary democracy (in particular in all Central-Eastern European countries) within the systems of positive, but not negative parliamentarism<sup>18</sup>. This is proved by the data, given in Table 1, which represents the history of minority cabinets formation and functioning in the European systems of positive parliamentarism in 1944-2014.

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<sup>18</sup> Additionally see.: K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; M. Taylor, M. Laver, Government coalitions in Western Europe, „European Journal of Political Research” 1973, vol 1, s. 205–248.

**Table 1.** The History of Minority Cabinets Formation in the European Systems of Positive Parliamentarism (1944–2014)<sup>19</sup>

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
The Prime-Minister	Duration of the cabinet in power	Type of the cabinet	The Prime-Minister's party	Party composition of the cabinet	Ideological positioning of the party cabinet	Deputies of government parties/ composition of the parliament, №	Reasons of the cabinet resignation	Duration, days
Belgium								
P.-H. Spaak I	13.03.1946 – 20.03.1946	SPM	BSP-PSB	BSP-PSB	SD, DS	66/202	Change of the cabinet composition	7
A. Van Acker IV	22.04.1954 – 02.06.1958	CM	BSP-PSB	BSP-PSB + LP-PL	SD, DS, L	106/212	Parliamentary elections	1480
G. Eyskens II	23.06.1958 – 04.11.1958	SPM	PSC-CVP	PSC-CVP	CD, E	104/212	Change of the cabinet composition	131
L. Tindemans I	25.04.1974 – 11.06.1974	CM	CVP	CVP + PSC + PVV + PRL	CD, CH, L, CL, SL	102/212	Change of the cabinet composition	46
L. Tindemans III	06.03.1977 – 18.04.1977	CM	CVP	CVP + PSC + PVV + PRL	CD, CH, L, CL, SL	102/212	Parliamentary elections	42
G. Verhofstadt III	10.06.2007 – 21.12.2007	CM	0-VLD	MR + PS + 0-VLD + SPa+Spi	L, CL, SD, SL	75/150	Change of the cabinet composition	191
Y. Leterme III	13.06.2010 – 06.12.2011	CM	CD&V	PS + MR + CD&V + CDH	SD, L, CL, CD, CH	70/150	Change of the cabinet composition	533
Bulgaria								
P. Dimitrov	05.11.1991 – 28.12.1992	SPM	SDS	SDS	CD, C, NC	110/240	Loss of vote of confidence	413
S. Sofiyanski	12.02.1997 – 20.05.1997	SPM	SDS	SDS	CD, C, NC	69/240	Parliamentary elections	98
B. Borisov I	27.07.2009 – 20.02.2013	SPM	GERB	GERB	C, P	116/240	Voluntary resignation	1283
P. Orshanski	29.05.2013 – 23.07.2014	CM	n/p	KzB + DPS	SD, DS, L, SL, Min, T	120/240	Voluntary resignation	414
B. Borisov II	07.11.2014 – current	CM	GERB	GERB + RB + ABV	C, P, SD	118/240	–	–
Croatia								
I. Račan III	30.07.2002 – 23.11.2003	CM	SPH	SPH + HSS + HNS + LS + LIBRA	SD, AF, E, A, SC, L, SL, EC	65/151	Parliamentary elections	473

<sup>19</sup> Belgium governments have been analyzed since 1946, Bulgarian – since 1991, Croatian – since 2000, Czech – since 1992, Estonian – since 1992, Finnish – since 2000, German – since 1949, Greek – since 1974, Hungarian – since 1990, Irish – since 1944, Italian – since 1945, Latvian – since 1993, Lithuanian – since 1992, Maltese – since 1992, Romanian – since 1989, Slovakian – since 1990, Slovenian – since 1990, Spanish – since 1977. The analysis includes temporary (acting) minority cabinets. Lines with temporary (acting) minority cabinets are marked with grey. Legend: SPM – single-party minority cabinet; CM – coalition minority cabinet; n/p – non-party affiliation of the prime-minister; YT – duration of the government; A – agrarianism; AF – antifascism; C – conservatism; CD – Christian democracy; CH – Christian humanism; CL – conservative liberalism; DS – democratic socialism; E – Europeanism; EC – ecological conservatism; Eco – ecologism; EL – economic liberalism; ES – Euroscepticism; L – liberalism; LC – liberal conservatism; Min – national minorities' interests; N – nationalism; NC – national-conservatism; P – populism; R – regionalism; S – socialism (communism); SD – social-democracy; SC – social-conservatism; SL – social-liberalism; T – technocracy.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
I. Sanader I	23.12.2003 – 10.02.2006	CM	HDZ	HDZ + DC	CD, N, C, NC, E, L, LC	66/152	Change of the cabinet composition	767
I. Sanader I	11.02.2006 – 25.11.2007	SPM	HDZ	HDZ	CD, N, C, NC, E	66/152	Parliamentary elections	644
J. Kosor II	10.07.2010 – 23.12.2011	CM	HDZ	HDZ + HSS + SDSS	CD, N, C, NC, E, A, SC, EC, SD, SL, Min, AF	75/153	Parliamentary elections	523
Czech Republic								
V. Klaus III	02.07.1996 – 28.11.1997	CM	ODS	ODS + KDU-CSL + ODA	C, LC, L, ES, CD, R	99/200	Change of the cabinet composition	506
J. Tosovsky	02.01.1998 – 16.07.1998	CM	n/p	KDU-CSL + ODA + US	CD, R, L, T	31/200	Parliamentary elections	194
M. Zeman	17.07.1998 – 14.02.2002	SPM	CSSD	CSSD	CD	74/200	Parliamentary elections	1287
M. Topolánek I	16.08.2006 – 03.10.2006	SPM	ODS	ODS	C, LC, EL, ES	81/200	Loss of vote of confidence	47
M. Topolánek II	09.01.2007 – 24.03.2009	CM	ODS	ODS + KDU-CSL + SZ	C, LC, L, ES, CD, R, Eco, SL	100/200	Loss of vote of confidence	795
Estonia								
T. Vahi III	01.12.1996 – 13.03.1997	SPM	EKK	EKK	L	41/101	Voluntary resignation	102
M. Siimann	14.03.1996 – 28.03.1999	SPM	EKK	EKK	L	41/101	Parliamentary elections	1094
S. Kallas	28.02.2002 – 09.04.2003	CM	ERe	EK + ERe	L, SD, SL, P	46/101	Parliamentary elections	399
A. Ansip III	21.05.2009 – 06.03.2011	CM	ERe	ERe + IRL	SD, SL, P, C, CD, NC	50/101	Parliamentary elections	645
Finland								
Since 2000, after the introduction of the system of positive parliamentarism, minority cabinets are not peculiar.								
Germany								
Since 1949, after the introduction of the system of positive parliamentarism, minority cabinets are not peculiar.								
Greece								
K. Mitsotakis	11.04.1990 – 09.09.1993	SPM	ND	ND	CD, C, LC, EL, E	150/300	Loss of vote of confidence	1228
A. Samaras I	20.06.2012 – 21.06.2013	SPM	ND	ND	CD, C, LC, EL, E	129/300	Change of the cabinet composition	361
Hungary								
F. Gyurcsány III	02.05.2008 – 28.03.2009	SPM	MSZP	MSZP	SD	190/386	Voluntary resignation	326
G. Bajnai	14.04.2009 – 25.04.2010	SPM	MSZP	MSZP	SD	190/386	Parliamentary elections	371
Ireland								
J. Costello I	18.02.1948 – 13.06.1951	CM	FG	FG + Lab + CnP + CnT + NL	CD, LC, SC, E, SD, C, A	67/147	Parliamentary elections	1195
É. de Valera VIII	13.06.1951 – 02.06.1954	SPM	FF	FF	C, P	69/147	Parliamentary elections	1069
S. Lemass II	11.10.1961 – 21.04.1965	SPM	FF	FF	C, P	70/144	Parliamentary elections	1270
S. Lemass III	21.04.1965 – 10.11.1966	SPM	FF	FF	C, P	72/144	Voluntary resignation	559

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
J. Lynch I	10.11.1966 – 02.07.1969	SPM	FF	FF	C, P	72/144	Parliamentary elections	952
G. Fitzgerald I	30.06.1981 – 09.03.1982	CM	FG	FG + Lab	CD, LC, SC, E, SD	80/166	Parliamentary elections	249
C. Haughey II	09.03.1982 – 14.12.1982	SPM	FF	FF	C, P	81/166	Parliamentary elections	275
C. Haughey III	10.03.1987 – 12.07.1989	SPM	FF	FF	C, P	81/166	Parliamentary elections	842
C. Haughey IV	12.07.1989 – 11.02.1992	CM	FF	FF + PD	C, P, L, CL	83/166	Voluntary resignation	929
A. Reynolds I	11.02.1992 – 12.01.1993	CM	FF	FF + PD	C, P, L, CL	83/166	Parliamentary elections	331
J. Bruton	12.12.1994 – 26.06.1997	CM	FG	FG + Lab + DUP	CD, LC, SC, E, SD, DS	82/166	Parliamentary elections	914
B. Aherm I	26.06.1997 – 06.06.2002	CM	FF	FF + PD	C, P, L, CL	81/166	Parliamentary elections	1780
Italy								
A. De Gasperi IV	31.05.1947 – 12.05.1948	CM	DC	DC + PRI + PSDI + PLI	CD, P, E, L, SL, SD	230/556	Parliamentary elections	342
A. De Gasperi VIII	16.07.1953 – 28.07.1953	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	263/590	Voluntary resignation	12
G. Pella	17.08.1953 – 15.01.1954	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	263/590	Voluntary resignation	148
A. Fanfani I	18.01.1954 – 30.01.1954	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	263/590	Change of the cabinet composition	12
M. Scelba	10.02.1954 – 06.06.1955	CM	DC	DC + PSDI + PLI	CD, P, E, SD, L	295/590	Voluntary resignation	476
A. Segni I	22.07.1955 – 16.05.1957	CM	DC	DC + PSDI + PLI	CD, P, E, SD, L	295/590	Voluntary resignation	654
A. Zoli	19.05.1957 – 19.07.1958	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	263/590	Parliamentary elections	420
A. Fanfani II	01.07.1958 – 15.02.1959	CM	DC	DC + PSDI	CD, P, E, SD	295/596	Change of the cabinet composition	224
A. Segni II	15.02.1959 – 24.02.1960	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	273/596	Voluntary resignation	369
F. Tambroni	26.03.1960 – 19.07.1960	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	273/596	Voluntary resignation	113
A. Fanfani III	26.07.1960 – 12.02.1962	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	273/596	Change of the cabinet composition	556
G. Leone I	21.06.1963 – 05.11.1963	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	260/630	Change of the cabinet composition	134
G. Leone II	24.06.1968 – 19.11.1968	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	266/630	Change of the cabinet composition	145
M. Rumor II	05.08.1969 – 17.02.1970	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	266/630	Change of the cabinet composition	192
G. Andreotti I	17.02.1972 – 26.02.1972	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	266/630	Loss of vote of confidence	9
G. Andreotti II	26.07.1972 – 12.07.1973	CM	DC	DC + PSDI + PLI	CD, P, E, SD, L	315/630	Change of the cabinet composition	346
A. Moro IV	23.11.1974 – 07.01.1976	CM	DC	DC + PRI	CD, P, E, L	281/630	Change of the cabinet composition	404
A. Moro V	12.02.1976 – 30.04.1976	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	266/630	Parliamentary elections	78

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
G. Andreotti III	29.07.1976 – 16.01.1978	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	262/630	Loss of vote of confidence	527
G. Andreotti IV	11.03.1978 – 31.01.1979	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	262/630	Change of the cabinet composition	320
G. Andreotti V	20.03.1979 – 31.03.1979	CM	DC	DC + PSDI + PRI	CD, P, E, SD, L	291/630	Parliamentary elections	11
F. Cossiga I	04.08.1979 – 19.03.1980	CM	DC	DC + PSDI + PLI	CD, P, E, SD, L	291/630	Change of the cabinet composition	225
A. Fanfani VI	17.04.1987 – 28.04.1987	SPM	DC	DC	CD, P, E	225/630	Parliamentary elections	11
R. Prodi I	18.05.1996 – 09.10.1998	CM	PpP	PDS + PpP + DINI-RI + FdV	SD, DS, CD, L, Eco	288/630	Loss of vote of confidence	861
M. D'Alema II	21.12.1999 – 25.04.2000	CM	DS	DS + PpP + RII + PdC + FdV + UDEUR + ID	SD, SL, DS, CD, L, S, Eco	295/630	Voluntary resignation	124
G. Amato II	28.04.2000 – 31.05.2001	CM	n/p	DS + PpP + RII + PdC + FdV + UDEUR + ID + SDI	SD, SL, DS, CD, L, S, Eco	295/630	Parliamentary elections	393
Latvia								
V. Birkavs	07.08.1993 – 14.09.1994	CM	LC	LC + LZS	L, CL, A	48/100	Loss of vote of confidence	397
M. Gailis	15.09.1994 – 20.12.1995	CM	LC	LC + TPA	L, CL	41/100	Parliamentary elections	455
G. Krasts II	08.04.1998 – 03.10.1998	CM	LC	TB/LNNK + LC + LZS + KDS	N, NC, ES, L, CL, A, CD	35/100	Parliamentary elections	175
V. Kristopans I	26.11.1998 – 03.02.1999	CM	LC	LC + TB/LNNK + JP	N, NC, ES, L, CL, C	46/100	Loss of vote of confidence	67
V. Kristopans II	04.02.1999 – 15.07.1999	CM	LC	LC + TB/LNNK + JP	N, NC, ES, L, CL, C	46/100	Loss of vote of confidence	161
I. Emsis	09.03.2004 – 01.12.2004	CM	ZZS	TP + ZZS + LPP	C, LC, A, EC, ES, CD	42/100	Loss of vote of confidence	262
A. Kalvitis II	08.04.2006 – 06.11.2006	CM	ZZS	TP + ZZS + LPP	C, LC, A, EC, ES, CD	42/100	Parliamentary elections	208
V. Dombrovskis II	17.03.2010 – 02.10.2010	CM	JL	ZZS + JL + PS + TB/LNNK	A, EC, ES, C, LC, EL, N, NC	44/100	Parliamentary elections	195
V. Dombrovskis IV	25.10.2011 – 27.11.2013	CM	V	V + ZRP + NA	LC, C, N, NC, EL, ES	50/100	Voluntary resignation	752
Lithuania								
A. Abisala	21.07.1992 – 02.12.1992	CM	n/p	SK + LKDP	C, E, CD, NC, LC, N	60/135	Parliamentary elections	131
R. Pakšas II	26.10.2000 – 02.07.2001	CM	LIIS	LIIS + NS	L, SL	63/141	Loss of vote of confidence	246
A. Brazauskas I	03.07.2001 – 14.12.2004	CM	NS	NS + LSDP	SL, SD	29/141	Parliamentary elections	1241
A. Brazauskas III	11.04.2006 – 31.05.2006	CM	LSDP	DP + LSDP + LVLS	L, SL, P, SD, A	69/141	Change of the cabinet composition	50
G. Kirkilas	04.07.2006 – 27.11.2008	CM	LSDP	LSDP + LiCS + LVLS + PDP	L, SL, CL, A	55/141	Parliamentary elections	863
Malta								
G. Borg Olivier I	05.03.1962 – 07.04.1966	SPM	PN	PN	C, CD, E, N	25/50	Parliamentary elections	1472
Poland								
J. K. Bielecki	12.01.1991 – 23.12.1991	CM	KLD	ZSL + SD + KLD + PC	A, S, L, CD	103/460	Parliamentary elections	341
J. Olszewski	23.12.1991 – 06.06.1992	CM	PC	ZChN + PC + PL	C, N, NC, CD, A	121/460	Loss of vote of confidence	163

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
W. Pawlak I	05.06.1992 – 10.07.1992	SPM	PSL	PSL	A, CD, SC	48/460	Loss of vote of confidence	35
J. Buzek II	07.06.2000 – 18.10.2001	SPM	AMS	AMS	CD, C	201/460	Parliamentary elections	491
L. Miller II	01.03.2003 – 01.05.2004	CM	SLD	SLD + UP	SD, E	216/460	Change of the cabinet composition	420
K. Marcinkiewicz I	31.10.2005 – 04.05.2006	SPM	PIS	PIS	C, NC, SC, P, ES	155/460	Change of the cabinet composition	184
Romania								
N. Vacaroiu I	13.11.1992 – 17.08.1994	SPM	n/p	FDSN	SD	117/341	Change of the cabinet composition	634
N. Vacaroiu II	18.08.1994 – 01.09.1996	CM	n/p	PDSR + PUINR	SD, N	147/341	Change of the cabinet composition	733
N. Vacaroiu III	02.09.1996 – 11.12.1996	SPM	n/p	PDSR	SD	117/341	Parliamentary elections	99
A. Nestase I	20.12.2000 – 19.06.2003	SPM	PDSR	PDSR	SD	155/345	Change of the cabinet composition	899
A. Nestase II	19.06.2003 – 28.11.2004	SPM	PSD	PSD	SD	155/345	Parliamentary elections	519
C. Popescu-Tariceanu I	29.12.2004 – 03.12.2006	CM	PNL	PNL + PD + UDMR + PUR	L, CL, C, R, SC	134/332	Change of the cabinet composition	694
C. Popescu-Tariceanu II	07.12.2006 – 01.04.2007	CM	PNL	PNL + PD + UDMR	L, CL, C, R	134/332	Change of the cabinet composition	114
C. Popescu-Tariceanu III	05.04.2007 – 30.11.2008	CM	PNL	PNL + UDMR	L, CL, C, R	86/332	Parliamentary elections	595
E. Boc II	23.12.2009 – 19.05.2010	CM	PD-L	PD-L + UDMR	L, LC, CD, C, R	137/334	Change of the cabinet composition	146
E. Boc III	19.05.2010 – 06.02.2012	CM	PD-L	PD-L + UDMR + UNPR	L, LC, CD, C, R, SD	153/334	Voluntary resignation	617
M. R. Ungureanu	09.02.2012 – 27.04.2012	CM	PD-L	PD-L + UDMR + UNPR	L, LC, CD, C, R, SD	158/334	Loss of vote of confidence	78
V. Ponta I	07.05.2012 – 09.12.2012	CM	PSD	PSD + PNL + PC	SD, L, CL, C, SC	147/334	Parliamentary elections	212
V. Ponta III	04.03.2014 – 27.11.2014	CM	PSD	PSD + UDMR + PC + UNPR	SD, C, R, SC	191/412	Change of the cabinet composition	263
V. Ponta IV	15.12.2014 – current	CM	PSD	PSD + LR + PC + UNPR	SD, L, SC	195/412	–	–
Slovakia								
V. Meciar IV	19.03.1993 – 16.11.1993	SPM	HZDS	HZDS	C, NC, P	66/150	Change of the cabinet composition	237
J. Moravcik	16.03.1994 – 12.12.1994	CM	APR	SDL + KDH + APR + ADS + NDS	S, SD, CD, SC, L	71/150	Parliamentary elections	266
M. Dzurinda III	08.02.2006 – 03.07.2006	CM	Smer	Smer + LS-HZDS + SNS	SD, P, C, NC, N, ES	50/150	Parliamentary elections	145
I. Radkova I	08.07.2010 – 11.10.2011	CM	SDKU-DS	SDKU-DS + SaS + KDH + MH	CD, LC, SC, L, ES	75/150	Loss of vote of confidence	453

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
I. Radicova II	20.10.2011 – 10.03.2012	CM	SDKU-DS	SDKU-DS + SaS + KDH + MH	CD, LC, SC, L, ES	73/150	Parliamentary elections	140
Slovenia								
J. Dmosek I	22.04.1992 – 25.01.1993	CM	LDS	SDP + LDS + Zs + SDZS + DS	SD, L, SL, Eco	40/80	Parliamentary elections	273
J. Dmosek IV	26.01.1996 – 10.11.1996	CM	LDS	LDS + SKD	L, SL, CD, SC	37/90	Parliamentary elections	284
A. Bajuk	07.06.2000 – 15.10.2000	CM	SLs	SLs + SDS	CD, C, A, LC, NC	35/90	Parliamentary elections	128
B. Pahor II	27.06.2011 – 20.09.2011	CM	SD	SD + LDS	L, SL, SD	33/90	Loss of vote of confidence	83
Spain								
A. Suarez I	04.07.1977 – 01.03.1979	SPM	UCD	UCD	L, CD, SD	166/350	Parliamentary elections	597
A. Suarez II	05.04.1979 – 25.02.1981	SPM	UCD	UCD	L, CD, SD	168/350	Voluntary resignation	680
L. Galvo-Sotelo	26.02.1981 – 28.10.1982	SPM	UCD	UCD	L, CD, SD	168/350	Parliamentary elections	602
F. Gonzalez III	05.12.1989 – 14.07.1993	SPM	PSOE	PSOE	SD, E	175/350	Parliamentary elections	1299
F. Gonzalez IV	09.07.1993 – 06.05.1996	SPM	PSOE	PSOE	SD, E	159/350	Parliamentary elections	1017
J. M. Aznar I	05.05.1996 – 27.04.2000	SPM	PP	PP	C, LC, CD, EL	156/350	Parliamentary elections	1432
J. L. R. Zapatero I	17.04.2004 – 09.03.2008	SPM	PSOE	PSOE	SD, E	164/350	Parliamentary elections	1402
J. L. R. Zapatero II	12.04.2008 – 20.11.2011	SPM	PSOE	PSOE	SD, E	169/350	Parliamentary elections	1298

Zródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parl.gov.org/> [odczyt: 01.02.2015].

**Parties in Belgium:** BSP-PSB – the Belgian Socialist Party (Belgische Socialistische Partij – Parti Socialiste Belge); LP-PL – the Liberal Party (Liberale Partij – Parti libéral); PSC-CVP – the Christian People’s Party (Parti Social Chrétien – Christelijke Volkspartij); CVP – the Flemish Christian People’s Party (Christelijke Volkspartij); PSC – the Democratic Center (Parti Social Chrétien); PVV – the Party of Freedom and Progress (Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang); PRL – the Liberal Reformist Party (Parti Réformateur Libéral); MR – the Reformist Movement (Mouvement Réformateur); PS – the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste); O-VLD – the Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten); SPa+Spi – Another Socialist Party – the Social and Liberal Party (Socialistische Partij Anders / Sociaal-Liberale Partij); CD&V – the Christian Democrats and Flemings (Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams); CDH – the Humanistic Democratic Centre (Centre Démocrate Humaniste).

**Parties in Bulgaria:** SDS – the Union of Democratic Forces (Suyuz na Demokratichnite Sili); GERB – the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (Grazhdani za Evropeysko Razvitie na Balgariya); KzB – the Coalition for Bulgaria (Koalitsiya za Balgariya); DPS – the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi); RB – the Reformist Bloc (Reformatorski Blok); ABV – the Alternative for Bulgarian Revival (Alternativa za balgarsko vazrazhdane).

**Parties in Croatia:** SPH – the Social-Democratic Party of Croatia (Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske); HSS – the Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka); HNS – the Croatian People’s Party – Liberal Democrats (Hrvatska narodna stranka – Liberalni demokrati); LS – the Liberal Party (Liberalna stranka); LIBRA – the Party of Liberal Democrats (LIBRA – Stranka liberalnih demokrata); HDZ – the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica); DC – the Democratic Centre (Demokratski centar); SDSS – the Independent Democratic Serb Party (Samostalna demokratska srpska stranka).

**Parties in the Czech Republic:** ODS – the Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana); KDU-CSL – the Christian-Democratic Union – People’s Party (Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová); ODA – the Civic Democratic Alliance (Občanská demokratická aliance); US – the Union of Freedom (Unie svobody); CSSD – the Czech Social-Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálně demokratická); SZ – the Green Party (Strana zelených).

**Parties in Estonia:** EKK – the Estonian Coalition Party (Eesti Koonderakond); ERe – the Estonian Reformist Party (Eesti Reformierakond); EK – the Estonian Centrist Party (Eesti Keskerakond); IRL – the „Pro Patria“ and „Res Publica“ Union (Erakond Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit).

**Parties in Greece:** ND – the New Democracy (Néa Ďimokratía).

**Parties in Hungary:** MSZP – the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt).

**Parties in Ireland:** FG – the Fine Gael (Fine Gael); Lab – the Labour Party (Labour Party); CnP – the Republican Party (Clann na Poblachta); CnT – the Earth Party (Clann



na Talmhan); NL – the National Labour Party (National Labour Party); FF – the Fianna Fail (Fianna Fáil); PD – the Progressive Democrats (Progressive Democrats); DLP – the Democratic Left (Democratic Left).

**Parties in Italy:** DC – the Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana); PRI – the Republican Party (Partito Repubblicano Italiano); PSLI – the Socialist Party of Italian Workers (Partito Socialista Lavoratori Italiani); PLI – the Italian Liberal Party (Partito Liberale Italiano); PSDI – the Italian Democratic-Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano); PDS – the Democratic Party of Left (Partito Democratico della Sinistra); PpP – the People’s Party for Prodi (Popolari per Prodi); DINI-RI – the Dini List – Italian Renewal (Lista Dini – Rinnovamento Italiano); FdV – the Federation of Green (Federazione dei Verdi); DS – the Left Democrats (Democratici di Sinistra); RiI – the Italian Renewal (Rinnovamento Italiano); PdCI – the Party of Italian Communist (Partito dei Comunisti Italiani); UDEUR – the Union of Democrats for Europe (Unione Democratici per l’Europa); ID – the Democrats (I Democratici); SDI – the Italian Democrats-Socialists (Socialisti Democratici Italiani).

**Parties in Latvia:** LC – the Latvian Way (Latvijas Ceļš); LZS – the Farmers’ Union of Latvia (Latvijas Zemnieku Savienība); TPA – the Political Union of Economists (Tautsaimnieku politiskā apvienība); TB/LNNK – For Homeland and Freedom (Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK); KDS – the Christian-Democratic Union (Kristīgi demokrātiskā savienība); JP – the “New Party” (Jaunā partija); TP – the People’s Party (Tautas Partija); ZZS – the Union of Greens and Farmers (Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība); LPP – the First Latvian Party (Latvijas Pirmā partija); JL – the “New Era” (Jaunais Laiks); PS – the Civic Union (Pilsoniskā savienība); V – the “Unity” (Vienotība); ZRP – the Reformist Party (Reformu partija); NA – the national Alliance for Latvia (Nacionālā apvienība „Visu Latvijai!”).

**Parties in Lithuania:** SK – the Coalition “Sajudzio” (Sajudzio koalicija); LKDP – the Lithuanian Christian-Democrats (Lietuvos Krikščionys Demokratai); LliS – the Liberal Union of Lithuania (Lietuvos liberalų sąjunga); NS – the New Union (Naujoji sąjunga); LSDP – the Lithuanian Social-Democratic Party (Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija); DP – the Labour Party (Darbo Partija); LVLS – the Lithuanian Popular Peasant Union (Lietuvos valstiečių liaudininkų sąjunga); LiCS – the Liberal and Centrist Union (Liberalų ir centro sąjunga); PDP – the Civic Democratic Party (Pilietinės demokratijos partija).

**Parties in Malta:** PN – the National Party (Partit Nazzjonalista).

**Parties in Poland:** ZSL – the United People’s Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe); SD – the Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne); KLD – the Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny); PC – the Centre of Comprehension (Porozumienie Centrum); ZChN – the Christian-National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe); PL – the Peasant’s Alliance (Porozumienie Ludowe); PSL – the Polish Peasants’ Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe); AWS – the Electoral Action “Solidarity” (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy); SLD – the Union of Democratic Left (Sojusz

Lewicy Demokratycznej); UP – the Labour Party (Unia Pracy); PiS – the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość).

**Parties in Romania:** FDSN – the Front of National Democratic Salvation (Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale); PDSR – the Party of Social-Democracy in Romania (Partidul Democrației Sociale în România); PUNR – the Party of Romanian National Unity (Partidul Unității Naționale a Romanilor); PSD – the Social-Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat); PNL – the National Liberal party (Partidul Național Liberal); PD – the Democratic Party (Partidul Democrat); UDMR – the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România); PUR – the Conservative Party (Partidul Conservator); PD-L – the Democratic Liberal Party (Democratic Liberal Party); UNPR – the national Union for Romanian Progress (Uniunea Națională pentru Progresul României); PC – the Conservative Party (Partidul Conservator); LRP – the Liberal Reformist Party (Partidul Liberal Reformat).

**Parties in Slovakia:** HZDS – the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko); SDL – the Party of Democratic Left (Strana demokratickej ľavice); KDH – the Christian Democratic Movement (Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie); APR – the Alternative for the Realism Policy (Alternatíva politického realizmu); ADS – the Alliance of Democrats (Aliancia demokratov Slovenska); NDS – the National Democratic Party (Národno-demokratická strana); Smer – Direction – Social Democracy (Smer – sociálna demokracia); LS-HZDS – the People's Party – the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (Ľudová strana – Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko); SNS – the Slovakian National Party (Slovenská národná strana); SDKU-DS – the Slovákina Democratic and Christian Union (Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia – Demokratická strana); SaS – the Freedom and Solidarity (Sloboda a solidarita); MH – the Bridge (Most-Híd).

**Parties in Slovenia:** SDP – the Party of Democratic Renewal (Stranka demokratične preнове); LDS – the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (Liberalna demokracija Slovenije); ZS – the Greens of Slovenia (Zeleni Slovenije); SDZS – the Social-Democratic Union of Slovenia (Socialdemokratska zveza Slovenije SDZS); DS – the Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka); SKD – the Slovenian Christian Democrats (Slovenski krščanski demokrati); SLS – the Slovenian People's Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka); SDS – the Slovenian Democratic Party (Slovenska demokratska stranka); SD – the Social Democrats (Socialni demokrati).

**Parties in Spain:** UCD – the Union of Democratic Centre (Unión de Centro Democrático); PSOE – the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español); PP – the People's Party (Partido Popular).

As the *experience* proves, minority cabinets in the European systems of positive parliamentarism are not the consolidated phenomenon, as in some countries they have become the predominating type of the governments (i.e. are formed more often than majority cabinets, what is peculiar of Romania and Spain), in other countries they have become an ordinary or

institutionalized phenomenon (i.e. constitute more than a third, but less than a half of all cabinets, what is native to Bulgaria, Croatia, Ireland, Italy and Latvia), in the third countries, they have appeared to be a rare phenomenon (i.e. constitute a third or less of all cabinets, what is distinctive of Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), and in the fourth countries they have not been approved or had been used just once (Finland after 2000, Germany and Malta). The biggest number of minority cabinets during 1944–2014 (including temporary and acting governments) were formed in Italy (26), Romania (14) and Ireland (12). The biggest per cent of minority cabinets among other government cabinets (including temporary and acting governments) were observed in Spain (66,7), Romania (66,7) and Ireland (46,2). The least number of minority cabinets during 1944–2014 (including temporary and acting governments) were formed in Malta (1), Greece (2) and Hungary (2). The smallest per cent of minority cabinets among other government cabinets (including temporary and acting governments) were observed in Malta (6,7), Greece (9,1), Belgium (15,2) and Hungary (18,2). None minority cabinet was formed in such countries with the system of positive parliamentarism, as Finland and Germany (for detailed information see Table 2). Among all minority cabinets, which were created within the European systems of positive parliamentarism in 1944–2014 (and the total number of which, including temporary and acting governments, was 119 or 30,4 % of all government cabinets), the majority (115 or 96,6 %) was formed by stable minority cabinets. It shows, that in the countries, where minority cabinets are formed rather often, they constitute an ordinary phenomenon of inter-institutional (parliament and government) relations (what is peculiar of the systems of positive parliamentarism in Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Romania, and Spain<sup>20</sup>). On the contrary, for instance, in Bulgaria a half of minority cabinets is formed by temporary or acting governments. It argues, that minority cabinets in Bulgaria are not stable, and even when they are formed, they are considered to be temporary anticrisis/crisis phenomena (the exception is the minority cabinet of 2009–2013, headed by B. Borisov). It is peculiar, that among all minority cabinets in the European systems of positive parliamentarism, the majority is formed by the coalition governments (67 coalition to 52 single-party cabinets), and it differentiate between the systems of positive parliamentarism and the systems of negative parliamentarism, where among all minority cabinets, single-party cabinets predominate. The number of coalition minority cabinets is bigger than single-party minority cabinets in Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia (whereas in the last three countries, single-party minority cabinets have not been formed at all). Single-party minority cabinets prevail over coalition minority cabinets in Bulgaria, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Malta and Spain (whereas in the last four countries, coalition minority cabinets have not been formed at all). The equal number of coalition and single-party minority cabinets is native to Estonia,

<sup>20</sup> K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; V. Herman, J. Pope, *Minority Governments in Western Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 1973, nr 3, s. 191–212.

Ireland and Poland (for detailed information see Table 2). In most European systems of positive parliamentarism, especially in those countries, where minority cabinets are formed rarely and accidentally, such governments are cabinets with unstable support on the basis of the ad hoc agreement in particular, it is peculiar of Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and predominantly Latvia. However, in some European systems of positive parliamentarism, especially where minority cabinets are formed rather often, such governments are institutionalized, and sometimes (but not always) with stable support on the basis of general agreement. Non-government parties in such systems provide minority cabinets with parliamentary support/majority and publicly declare it. Here belong Ireland (especially in 40–60s and 80–90s of 20<sup>th</sup> c.), Italy (especially in 40–80s of 20<sup>th</sup> c.), Spain (especially since 1989), and partially Croatia and Romania.

**Table 2.** The Statistics of Minority Cabinets in the European Systems of Positive Parliamentarism (1944–2014)<sup>21</sup>

Country	Number of all governments, №	Number of all single-party minority cabinets	Number of all coalition minority cabinets	Percentage of all single-party minority cabinets	Percentage of all coalition minority cabinets
Belgium (since 1946)	46	2	5	4,3	10,9
Bulgaria (since 1991)	13	3	2	23,1	15,4
Croatia (since 2000)	9	1	3	11,1	33,3
Czech Republic (since 1992)	15	2	3	13,3	20,0
Estonia (since 1992)	14	2	2	14,3	14,3
Finland (since 2000)	9	–	–	–	–
Germany (since 1949)	25	–	–	–	–
Greece (since 1974)	22	2	–	9,1	–
Hungary (since 1990)	11	2	–	18,2	–
Ireland (since 1944)	26	6	6	23,1	23,1
Italy (since 1945)	66	15	11	22,7	16,7
Latvia (since 1993)	22	–	9	–	40,9
Lithuania (since 1992)	15	–	5	–	33,3
Malta (since 1962)	15	1	–	6,7	–
Poland (since 1989)	20	3	3	15,0	15,0
Romania (since 1990)	21	4	10	19,1	47,6
Slovakia (since 1990)	15	1	4	6,7	26,3
Slovenia (since 1990)	16	–	4	–	25,0
Spain (since 1977)	12	8	–	66,7	–
Total, №	392	52	67	13,3	17,1

Źródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parl.gov.org/> [odczyt: 01.02.2015].

Minority cabinets nearly in all European systems of positive parliamentarism became the leading and overall variant of inter-institutional balance between legislative and executive

<sup>21</sup> The analysis includes temporary (acting) minority cabinets.

branches under the condition of inability to form single-party and coalition minority cabinets of the “minimum range” format. The point is, that within the systems of positive parliamentarism “wide coalitions” or “coalitions of national unity” are formed extremely rarely. The exception is Germany, where since 1949 there has not been any minority cabinet, on the contrary, to solve conflicts concerning government formation, when it was not possible to form the “minimum ideological range” government (in case of Germany this is minimal-triumphant coalition), they three times formed “wide coalitions” between the ideological and government-forming rivals. Nowadays, to the systems, where minority cabinets have not been approved, belong Finland, Greece, Hungary and Malta (there were few or no minority cabinets). In other European systems of positive parliamentarism “wide coalitions” or “coalitions of national unity” have not been formed at all or their quantity is lesser than the number of minority cabinets.

The analysis of the European systems of positive parliamentarism, which are permanently or rarely or even not characterized by minority cabinets, argues, that there are several key reasons and motives for parliamentary parties to form minority cabinets (they are not distinctive of all countries and all cases of minority cabinets). *Firstly*, minority cabinets are more often formed in the context of the systems, where strong parliamentary opposition is formalized or stereotyped/established (for instance, Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Romania). The key attributes and resources of any strong parliamentary opposition usually are legal-political determination of parliamentary minority’s status and rights and/or formation and functioning of the systems of strong parliamentary committees<sup>22</sup>. *Secondly*, minority cabinets are more often formed in case of political systems, where group interests are usually predetermined not by pluralistic, but by corporate relations<sup>23</sup> (partially Belgium, Italy and Latvia, though it is not peculiar of Germany, where corporate relations have become widespread). It means, that great influence on minority cabinets functioning has non-parliamentary political opposition: minority cabinets are interested in extra-parliamentary support for their political activity and their political programs, and non-parliamentary political opposition (including various groups of interests) is interested in realization of its goals and tasks. *Thirdly*, minority cabinets theoretically (but not always practically, due to various historical, social and political

<sup>22</sup> K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990; W. Müller, K. Strom, *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.; K. Strom, W. C. Müller, T. Bergman, *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining. The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Oxford 2008.; K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Non-winning Cabinet Solutions*, “Comparative Political Studies” 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 199–227.; K. Strom, I. Budge, M. J. Laver, *Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, “American Journal of Political Science” 1994, vol 38, nr 2, s. 303–335.; K. Strom, *Parliamentary Committees in European Democracies*, “Journal of Legislative Studies” 1998, vol 4, nr 1, s. 21–59.; K. Strom, W. C. Müller, *The Keys to Togetherness: Coalition Agreements in Parliamentary Democracies*, “Journal of Legislative Studies” 1999, vol 5, nr 3–4, s. 255–282.; I. Mattson, K. Strom, *Parliamentary Committees*, [w:] H. Döring, *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. St. Martin’s Press 1995, s. 249–307.; I. Mattson, K. Strom, *Committee Effects on Legislation*, [w:] H. Döring, M. Hallerberg, *Patterns of Parliamentary Behavior: Passage of Legislation Across Western Europe*, Wyd. Ashgate 2004, s. 91–111.; W. C. Müller, K. Strom, *The Keys to Commitment: Coalition Agreements and Governance*, [w:] K. Strom, W. C. Müller, T. Bergman, *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 159–199.

<sup>23</sup> G. M. Luebbert, *A theory of government formation in multiparty democracies*, Wyd. Stanford University 1983.; G. M. Luebbert, *Comparative Democracy: Policy Making and Government Coalitions in Europe and Israel*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1986.

reasons) must be formed more often in case of the systems of positive parliamentarism, where the institution of a positive vote of confidence/vote of investiture, which is based on support, provided not by absolute, but by relative majority of deputies, from a nominal composition of the parliament/leading chamber of parliament, is institutionalized. The point is, that a positive vote of confidence in the government on the basis of relative majority of deputies, from a nominal composition of the parliament/leading chamber of parliament, does not make oppositional parties directly and frankly back up minority cabinets. Consequently, some oppositional parties, which do not declare their support for minority cabinets, can become loyal towards minority cabinets, in case when they are supported by other oppositional parties. In the context of a vote of confidence in minority cabinet on the basis of relative majority, the silent confidence of oppositional parties can be revealed. It cannot happen in case of a vote of confidence on the basis of absolute majority of deputies, from a nominal composition of the parliament or leading chamber of parliament. But the main comment is, that in general within the systems of positive parliamentarism in the light of formal-obligatory necessity for minority cabinet to pass a positive vote of confidence from the parliament, the main political responsibility is on minority cabinets, which must prove, that they have confidence and support of majority in the parliament. *Fourthly*, minority governments are more often formed in the political systems, where there is a strong, but not predominant parliamentary party (as, for instance, the Christian Democrats (DC) in Italy, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Croatia, the Fianna Fail (FF) in Ireland, the Social-Democratic Party (PSD) or the Democratic-Liberal Party (PD-L) in Romania, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)). The point is, that appropriateness of formation and duration of functioning of minority cabinets directly depend on the fact, that weak oppositional parties cannot reach the agreement as to the alternative for minority governments. *Fifthly*, in multiparty (not two-party or two and a half party) systems, minority cabinets are usually formed in the case, when they are headed by the parliamentary parties, which ideologically are more close to the center, conditionally speaking left-center, centrist, and right-center political parties, but which alone do not have absolute majority in the parliament. At least, it happens more often, than in case, when such governments are headed by the parties, which ideologically are far from the center (left or right) and are in opposition to each other<sup>24</sup>. That is why, minority cabinets are formed with the help of strong parties, which are ideologically close to the center.

However, even these suggested reasons and motives for minority cabinets formation in the European systems of positive parliamentarism *are not stable*. The point is, that in the analyzed representative sample of the countries, minority cabinets, in case of inability to form majority

<sup>24</sup> C. Crombez, *Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, nr 29, s. 1–29.; L. Martin, R. Stevenson, *Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Journal of Political Science" 2001, vol 45, nr 1, s. 33–50.; N. Schofield, *Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 23, s. 1–33.

cabinet, are rather rarely considered as those, which should be formed for the whole parliamentary term after parliamentary elections. This is permanently (but not always) has been peculiar of Ireland and Spain. On the contrary, minority cabinets are usually formed to solve political, inner-parliament and inter-party crisis, which is the result of the pre-term resignation of the former majority or minority government. Moreover, minority cabinets in the systems of positive parliamentarism are often formed shortly before regular or pre-term parliamentary elections, the results of which must help to form majority cabinet. For instance, this is represented by the institutional practice of such countries as Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The intermediate variant is shown by Italy and Romania. In general, it is obvious, that minority cabinets in the European systems of positive parliamentarism, at least in comparison with roles and interpretation of majority governments, *cannot be determined as the main format of cabinet-formation scenarios*.

And this is in spite of the fact, that minority cabinets in the European systems of positive parliamentarism very often *ideologically* imitate majority cabinets. In general, in the European systems of positive parliamentarism, in the party and ideological context predominate minority cabinets, whose parties adhere to the values and principles of Christian democracy, social democracy and populism, Minority cabinets, whose parties adhere to the values and principles of liberalism, conservatism, liberal-conservatism, social-liberalism, social-conservatism, and national-conservatism are rarely formed. The number of minority cabinets, whose parties adhere to the values and principles of conservative liberalism, agrarianism, ecologism, nationalism, regionalism, socialism and technocracy is even less. The number of parties, representing Euroscepticism and Europeanism, is approximately the same. In Belgium, minority cabinets usually combine the principles and values of social-democracy, Christian democracy and liberalism; in Bulgaria – Christian democracy, conservatism, social-democracy; in Croatia – Christian democracy, nationalism and conservatism; in the Czech Republic – conservatism, liberal conservatism, and Christian democracy; in Estonia – liberalism and social-democracy; in Greece – Christian democracy and conservatism (liberal conservatism); in Hungary – social-democracy; in Ireland – populism and conservatism; in Italy – Christian democracy and populism; in Lithuania – liberalism and social-liberalism; in Romania – social-democracy and liberalism; in Slovenia – social-liberalism and liberalism; in Spain – social-democracy and Christian democracy. Latvia, Poland and Slovakia were characterized by minority cabinets, which combine extremely different political ideologies.

The key reasons for *minority cabinets resignation and dismissal* in the European systems of positive parliamentarism traditionally are (in the way of lowering the frequency of certain factor's influence on minority cabinet resignation): regular/pre-term parliamentary elections, change of the cabinet composition, loss of a vote of confidence in minority cabinet on the part of the parliament, voluntary resignation of the government (or the prime-minister). But in different countries some correlation between these key factors of minority cabinets resignation

have been observed. For instance, in Croatia, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain prevails the factor of regular or pre-term parliamentary elections, in Belgium, Italy and Romania – the factor of the change of the cabinet composition, in Bulgaria – the factor of voluntary resignation of the government. In Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Poland an approximately equal number of different factors has been observed. In general, all terminal factors of minority cabinets resignation institutionalize their *stability*. The tendency of minority cabinets functioning in the systems of positive parliamentarism (even despite the fact, that in some of them minority cabinets are institutionalized) is their shorter period of functioning, in comparison with majority cabinets<sup>25</sup>. But some minority cabinets appear to be very stable and even in accordance with their average indices, they draw nearer to majority cabinets. This is represented by the data from Table 3, devoted to the comparative analysis of stability of minority cabinets in the European systems of positive parliamentarism.

**Table 3.** Stability of Minority Cabinets in the European Systems of Positive Parliamentarism (1944–2014)<sup>26</sup>

Country	Stability of all minority cabinets, years	Stability of temporary minority cabinets, years	Stability of permanent minority cabinets, years	Stability of temporary single-party minority cabinets, years	Stability of temporary coalition minority cabinets, years	Stability of permanent single-party minority cabinets, years	Stability of permanent coalition minority cabinets, years
Belgium	0,95	–	0,95	–	–	0,19	1,26
Bulgaria	1,51	0,70	2,32	0,27	1,13	1,13	3,52
Croatia	1,65	–	1,65	–	–	1,76	1,61
Czech Rep.	1,55	0,53	1,80	–	0,53	1,83	1,78
Estonia	1,53	–	1,53	–	–	1,64	1,43
Finland	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Germany	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Greece	2,18	–	2,18	–	–	2,18	–
Hungary	0,95	–	0,95	–	–	0,95	–
Ireland	2,37	–	2,37	–	–	2,27	2,46
Italy	0,75	0,02	0,78	0,02	–	0,59	1,01
Latvia	0,81	–	0,81	–	–	–	0,81
Lithuania	1,39	–	1,39	–	–	–	1,39
Malta	4,03	–	4,03	–	–	4,03	–
Poland	0,75	–	0,75	–	–	0,65	0,84
Romania	1,18	–	1,18	–	–	1,47	1,05
Slovakia	0,68	–	0,68	–	–	0,65	0,69
Slovenia	0,53	–	0,53	–	–	–	0,53
Spain	2,85	–	2,85	–	–	2,85	–
Total	1,31	0,49	1,34	0,15	0,83	1,54	1,18

Źródło: H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: <http://www.parlgov.org/> [odczyt: 01.02.2015].

<sup>25</sup> A. Romaniuk, *Porivniabnyi analiz politychnykh system kraïn Zakhidnoi Yevropy: instytutsiynyi vymir*, Lviv 2004, s. 206.

<sup>26</sup> The analysis includes temporary (acting) minority cabinets.



In particular, on the average, all minority cabinets (including temporary or acting ones) in 1944–2014 lasted only 1,31 years (what, is more than on the average in the European systems of negative parliamentarism – 1,28 y.). The longest one in Greece (2,18 y.), Ireland (2,37 y.), Malta (there existed one minority cabinet, which lasted for 4,03 y.) and Spain (2,85 y.), i.e. in those countries, where party systems have great tendencies towards two-party system. The shortest in Slovenia (0,53 y.), Slovakia (0,68 y.), Poland (0,75 y.), Latvia (0,81 p.), Italy (0,75 y.), Hungary (0,95 y.) and Belgium (0,95 y.), i.e. in those countries, where the party systems are usually defined as multi-party and factionalized/fragmented. It is notable, that in the European systems of positive parliamentarism there is no correlation between stability of minority cabinets and institutionalization of minority cabinets as a stable phenomenon. For example, minority cabinets were often formed in Ireland and Italy (in the latter even more often), but in the former they lasted on the average for 2,37 y., in the latter – just for 0,75 y. The same can be observed in case of little institutionalization of minority cabinets. Similar logic can be demonstrated by duration of the temporary cabinets, which are less stable, than permanent minority cabinets. Among minority cabinets in the systems of positive parliamentarism more steady usually are single-party cabinets. It is peculiar of Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania, and also Greece, Hungary, Malta and Spain (in the last four countries there were only single-party minority cabinets). Among single party minority cabinets, the most durable were governments in Malta (4,03 y.), Greece (2,18 y.), Ireland (2,27 y.) and Spain (2,85 y.). However, among minority cabinets in the systems of positive parliamentarism, coalition cabinets have appeared to be more stable in Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, Poland, Italy, Slovakia and also in Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia (in the last three countries there were only coalition minority cabinets). Among coalition minority cabinets, the most durable during 1944-2014 appeared to be governments in Bulgaria (3,52 y.) and Ireland (2,46 y.). Nearly the same time of duration of coalition and single-party minority cabinets was recorded in the Czech Republic (1,83 y. to 1,78 y.) and Slovakia (0,65 y. do 0,69 y.). Among the key problems of little duration/stability of minority cabinets in the European systems of positive parliamentarism, one should single out: 1) a bigger number of possible scenarios, as in comparison with majority cabinets, concerning the loss of a vote of confidence or obtaining a vote of no confidence by minority cabinets<sup>27</sup>; 2) less degree or insufficient degree, as in comparison with majority cabinets, of institutionalization of minority cabinets; 3) participation of a less, or insufficient number, as in comparison with majority cabinets, of political actors in the process of

<sup>27</sup> It happens as a result of a wish of oppositional parties, which actually form majority in the parliaments, to dictate their own will and political inclinations to minority cabinets, not joining the composition of the government or not taking direct political responsibility for the decisions, taken by the governments.

distribution of major posts and spheres of influence; 4) ideas and notions (not always rational and truthful<sup>28</sup>), concerning the fact, that minority cabinets are less effective and legitimate, than majority cabinets. However, frequency and stability of minority cabinets in the systems of positive parliamentarism increase, when political systems are constructed on the basis of consensus, corporatism, and when parliamentary support for minority cabinets is provided by parties with different (even opposed) ideologies, and party systems are not characterized by predominant parties.

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<sup>28</sup> Z. Maoz, B. Russett, *Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace, 1946-1986*, "American Political Science Review" 1993, nr 87, s. 626.; B. Prins, C. Sprecher, *Institutional constraints, political opposition, and interstate dispute escalation: Evidence from parliamentary systems, 1946-1989*, "Journal of Peace Research" 1999, nr 36, s. 271-287.; M. Ireland, S.S. Gartner, *Time to Fight. Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems*, "Journal of Conflict Resolution" 2001, nr 45, s. 547-568.